This is a practical essay meant especially for scholars trained in other disciplines or interdisciplinarians who want to "historicize" their topics but are unclear about historical methodology. It argues that historical scholarship, above all, pursues a rigorous understanding of how historical context creates transformation over time and historical contingency. Three subsections discuss the interpretive quality of history, historical context and contingency, and the archive as central to debates about historical explanations of the present. Each subsection includes advice for scholars who want to historicize their projects.
A while ago I attended a "Learning Outcomes" workshop given by our educational development unit. Like many there, my attendance came not from pedagogical curiosity but pressure from our administration to implement the logic of Learning Outcomes throughout University programming. Their goal, among others, was to give our Office of Quality Initiatives the means to assess teaching effectiveness across disciplines and levels. Instructors were required to articulate learning outcomes in their syllabi by choosing from a prescribed list of verbs (identify, analyze, and so on) and using them in statements like, "By the end of this course, students will be able to identify major developments in modern European thought." The skills a student gained from the course would be foregrounded in the syllabus and this would be a step toward the student-(and employer-) centric approach to pedagogy, a system with which many across the academy are now familiar. 1 Leaving aside my thoughts on the corporatized academy and learning metrics, this exercise led me to think specifically about what historical scholars do, to what effect, and why I don't think they discuss this practical side of their profession very much. In the workshop, I could not rely on the standard "pedagogical goals" phrase, "to teach students to think historically," because it did not describe an activity someone could do for an employer after the course. Likewise, the verb "historicize" was also useless because, firstly, it was not on the list, and secondly, it was too tautological to mean anything to people outside of historical studies. I reflected back on interactions I have had with students and colleagues in all kinds of disciplines, from film studies to political economy, as well as history, who claimed to "historicize" subjects but, when pressed, were unclear about what that meant or the value it added to their analysis. Why this disconnect? And can it be easily bridged? Are there general commonalities in how and why historical scholars analyze their topics that can mitigate this disconnect without necessarily having to plunge readers into master classes on method and theory?
It seems that history as an academic discipline suffers from people thinking they already know what it is and how to "do" it. This goes for the general public as well as scholars from everywhere in the academy, including history, and this may be why self-referential terminology like "historicize" is still used to explain the discipline. What follows then is a brief, practical elucidation of approaches and assumptions that are packed into the verb "to historicize," for lack of a better term. In three subsections below, I discuss questions of interpretation, historical context, contingency, and the archive as central to the value of historical explanations of our present. The subsections are: 1) History is interpretation and argument; 2) Contingency links the past with the present; and 3) The archive is not innocent so do not engage with it innocently. I do not expect that these points will be enlightening for those trained in historical studies but I offer them to begin a general discussion about what is crucial for non-historians to understand about history. To be clear, this is NOT an exercise in tracing the history of historical thought or assessing the influence of thinker X on historical writing. It is not meant to be an introduction to a textbook on the philosophy of history and it will not reflect the depth and breadth of debate that has gone on in academic circles in the last centuries. Instead, it is my articulation of certain methodological priorities, habits of thought, and acumen that the discipline, institutionalized as it is in the academy, fosters in its practitioners. My goal is to enable a direct, practical conversation about what historical scholars prioritize in their work, whether it is about archival research, narrativization, critical perspectives, interdisciplinary engagement, pedagogy, mentorship, activism, or administration, instead of channeling one through a discussion of the usual suspects -thinkers like Hegel and Braudelwhich is how the topic is typically framed in methods courses.
Some may be suspicious of my conceit to write down what historians care about and see this as a false assumption of homogeneity or a proscriptive agenda to police methodology and disciplinary boundaries. Neither is my intent. In part, I am following in the footsteps of institutions like the American Historical Association and the Canadian Historical Association, which post on their websites sections about their "Standards of Professional Conduct," "Shared Values of Historians," "Statement on Research Ethics," and "Core Values." 2 Instead of relying on professional associations or even the discipline of Education to define the field in a top-down way, however, I am partly observing, partly advocating that every historical professional needs to answer the, "What is the point of you?" question in accessible ways both in and outside of the academy on a regular basis. They also need to teach others to be able to do the same. My insistence on this is not universally agreed upon: anonymous readers of previous drafts of this piece have said that they have never encountered a need to explain history as a discipline to others. I am dumbfounded by this and read it as the academic equivalent of "Let them eat cake!" but this, too, must be part of the discussion.
In terms of what qualifies as good history, I do not assume or demand any specific philosophical, political, or theoretical approach, be it modernist, queer, poststructuralist, postcolonial, empiricist, feminist, posthumanist, what have you. Ahistorical approaches or ones that seek to provincialize Western concepts of history can be perfectly valid, especially if their authors understand and defend them as such. The heterogeneity of historical output, methodology, and those identifying as historians are vital strengths of the field, the academy, and society, in general. In the footnotes I have tried to signal some relevant further reading so that the reader can dig deeper into the points I discuss below. I invite other self-identified historians to debate my choices and write their own "outreach" pieces to 2 "Statement on Research Ethics" and "Core Values," Canadian Historical Association, <cha-shc.ca/english/about-the-cha/statement-on-research-ethics. html#sthash.BiL43phk.dpbs>, accessed 5 May 2019; "Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct," and "Shared Values of Historians," American Historical Association, <historians.org/jobs-and-professional-development/ statements-standards-and-guidelines-of-the-discipline/statement-onstandards-of-professional-conduct>, accessed 5 May 2019. explain themselves to the rest of the academy and, more importantly, to anyone who wants to know what historians bring to the problems of today. I mean for this to be a beginning of a conversation, not the final word, which is how ideas like these are so often framed, yet underdiscussed, in practical methods primers. 3
I. HISTORY IS INTERPRETATION AND ARGUMENT
The question "what is history?" is often the starting point in any history class from first year undergraduate to the PhD level. Rather than rehearse these debates, I am going to come at the question from a non-Western angle, informed by Daniel Woolf's A Global History of History (2011). History as a major category of knowledge, as well as historian as a professional government position, emerged in what is usually referred to as China at least by the fourth century bce. While "history" in English is sometimes used interchangeably with "the past," in China, history (史 shi, or the more modern translation of the word 历史 歷史 lishi, composed of 历歷 li, 史 shi) was separate from the concept of the past (过去 過去 guoqu, 往 wang, or 昔 xi); the two would not be mistaken for one another. The past referred to a total reality that had taken place. Shi, in contrast, referred to the activity of court historians who, early in the development of Chinese governance, were vested with recording the ruler's words and actions, hence their titles as the Recorder of the Left and Recorder of the Right. Together they produced an official archive of sources but always with the awareness that there was an act of interpretation alive in taking down each record, hence the need for more than one Recorder, and that the meaning of any record was also subject to present as well as future interpretation. Thus, knowledge about the past was understood to be partial and open to debate. Many interpreters did not mask the contradictions that arose in their understanding of the records. Instead they wrote about the array of information available about a past that was unknowable in its totality. 6 In discussing shi, it is not my intention to imply that Chinese authorities did not find ways to expunge interpretations and sources they found unfavourable; they did. Nor should the reader infer that writing systems are necessary for historical consciousness; that is false, as well. My point is that it is useful to keep a clear distinction between the past and history because it emphasizes key concepts in much historical practice: 1) the past is unrecoverable in its totality; 2) scholars today have only records from the past (written, audible, remembered, or material); 3) any record is only an interpretation of or partial glimpse into a past reality; and 4) when people examine these records to find out information about the past, they are but interpreters themselves, looking for information for their own reasons and understanding it through their own ways of thinking. Sometimes the records corroborate one another, sometimes they contradict. Often, they are about completely different things and the way to make sense of them is not obvious or singular. What this means is that historians are not simply keepers of facts or knowers of "the truth" of what happened, although they may be the ones most familiar with what is contained in the records. Instead, as Robert Doran argues in the anthology Philosophy of History After Hayden White (2013), historical scholars are interpreters who make choices about how and what records to consult, where to look for these records, how to engage with them, how to weigh them against one another to detect corroboration and contradiction, what is extraneous information, and what might be the meaning of "silences" in the records in terms of what was not said and what was not recorded or kept. Beyond that, historical scholars also decide how a narrative of what happened is rendered and, in doing so, can never entirely escape molding their narratives to answer the questions of the present. Questions they decide on include: Is the primary goal of the interpretation to explain the present in terms of the past, to understand the actions of past actors on their own terms, both or neither? Will the narrative of what happened be presented as a singular, omniscient reconciliation of information from the sources; something that preserves the complex, contradictory, and multivocal quality of the record; or something else? Will this narrative prioritize one factor amongst the many alive in the past and how will that focus be justified? Myriad choices must be made. 7 A way of summing up all of these choices is to say that historians make assertions about what is historically significant from the records and produce their interpretation in justification of those assertions, citing the records and other interpretations they are informed by and, sometimes but not always, revealing their decision-making process. One interpreter's decisions will not necessarily be the same as another's and therefore one assertion of historical significance will not necessarily be the same as another, which means that academic historical output is inherently argumentative because each author is working to make a case for why their project is historically significant.
Because all historical output is contingent upon countless choices, a single narrative is never definitive. In the academy, it enters into, and comes out of, perpetual conversations that evaluate others' choices regarding historical significance, narrative frameworks, and records from the past. In other words, while historians can choose what and how to write about the past, their output is always evaluated within and against other interpretations. Interpretations of "what happened" are built upon and against other interpretations, consciously and unconsciously. Historians refer to the spectrum of interpretation and critique about the past as historiography.
The historiography of a particular subject can be studied to find areas of consensus and contention and how these change over time. In terms of how historical output is done, one engages with records, others' interpretations, historiographical critiques, and peer review of one's own work, all amidst changing concerns about the present and why people would care about this past in the first place. Like all kinds of scholarly output, it is a process of rendering, receiving feedback, and revising. 8 Therefore, all historical production is done in a crucible of conversation about the past, the process, the academy, and the world.
In practical terms, this means that all scholars who base their analysis on historical work are also making historical choices, choosing a version of the past they want to activate in their own projects. For non-historians, if the "historical background" of their topic is based on only one monograph, they are privileging (and aligning themselves with) one particular slice of the historiography available on that topic in the past. It is not that this is unacceptable, it is that the scholar needs to be aware of their choice and be ready to defend its exclusivity. Historical output is done to enter into specific debates about the past, the present, and how history ought to be rendered. It is not objective, it is part of a conversation. This means that if someone looking to write the "historical background" chapter of their analysis of the present asks an historian for information, they will likely receive a list of books and articles, instead of the often-asked-for slim, singular volume that offers a quick run-down of "what happened." Take this list as a signal that one should be prepared to think about the topic and the information they take from these sources historiographically as well as historically. Without this level of understanding, one runs the risk of authorizing a version of the past that actually works against their politics in the present. They also miss an opportunity to connect the choices they make about the past to their analysis of the present.
My practical advice to those who want to understand the choices others have made and decide what to build on in their own historical scholarship is this: instead of only mining history monographs for "the facts," read the introductions to see what kinds of historical conversations the authors intervene in, how, and why. Try to get a sense of their argument and its place in the historiography; book reviews can help with this as well. By engaging with chapter titles and subtitles, try to discern how the author has framed the story of what happened in a way that furthers their implicit or explicit argument about historical significance. Consider the records upon which authors have based their analyses and how the use of certain records enable and limit interpretations. After all of this, then choose what to import outright, what to import with caveats, and what to reject from CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 this secondary literature. Consider how one's own historical output will enter into these conversations. Be ready to defend those choices.
II. CONTINGENCY LINKS THE PAST WITH THE PRESENT
Everyone in the present is making choices based on the information they think they know about themselves and the world around them. They do not know the future so they do what they think is best in the present and go from there. Thus, their actions are contingent upon a number of factors, internal and external, and their resulting actions might be conscious, instinctive, or products of habituation. This same level of contingency holds for actors in the past. The reality that they inhabited had an unknown future. It was animated by all kinds of external pressure and internal anxiety having to do with material constraints, ideological conversations, cultural conventions, sensual experiences, environmental changes, and so on. For some, it made sense to create records about their reality -or how they wished their reality to be understood in retrospect -and it is these records that historical scholars engage with to learn about the past. Again, these records can be written, remembered, audible, visual, or material. Each record was created with an agenda and came out of a specific context of multiple factors, what historians call its historical context because it was created in a present that many today now understand to be a specific time and place in the past.
To engage with a record critically, that is to not automatically accept its information as the objective truth, is to consider it as a product of its historical context whereby the actor(s) who created it did so because of factors alive in their context. The insistence that historical scholars strive to understand how a subject of study was a product of its historical context is usually thought of as historicism today, although the reader should be aware that the meaning of the term has transformed over time and is, itself, a philosophical can of worms. 9 To historicize a subject is to study it as a product of its historical context, wild with contingency, just as the present is for people today. 10 Judging those in the past for not anticipating immense events like World War I, events that some today treat as inevitable, is usually about moralizing rather than historicizing and obscures knowledge about contingency. What might seem obvious to scholars today about the past might not have been discernible for those who lived it and only research into the historical context can offer insight into the unique context that enabled those in the past to act as they did. 9 Doran, "Choosing the Past: Hayden White and the Philosophy of History," 14; Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957). 10
My thanks to Y.S. Lee for the phrase, "wild with contingency," which she used to characterize good historical fiction.
Many historical scholars, today, see their role as being to emphasize not only the understanding of phenomena within a temporal dimension, but, above all, historical contingency in understandings about the past. That means insisting that historical contexts are not understood as a given set of circumstances, obvious, stable, and stagnant, but tense and subject to change according to the actions made within them at any given moment. Continuities over time did not just happen, they were the result of people choosing (mindfully or not) to do things the way they had done them the day before. Cultural theorists have argued that these "choices" become unconscious to the extent that the actors themselves might not think that they have a choice, or ever had one, but in any given cultural milieu or historical context there were people on the fringes of what was considered "normal." They inhabited what could be seen as different choices and in doing so stood testament to the reality of difference and contingency. 11 Oftentimes considerable effort was made to invalidate their existence and with it the obviousness of contingency. Actors found themselves weighing all of this on a daily basis, sometimes resisting dominant trends, sometimes following them, sometimes seeking out new sources of information, and, in turn, influencing those around them. The sum of this activity multiplied across all historical actors (human and non-human) and material factors in the environment creates the historical context.
One payoff of emphasizing contingency in the past is to encourage people, today, to understand themselves as actors in the present. They do not have to accept their circumstances as bound or unchangeable; all is contingent and subject to transformation over time. Given that a lot of output from the humanities and the social sciences is designed to intervene in policies and practices of the present, keeping alive historical contingency can work toward these same aims. Activity and, indeed, activism, in the past can compel activity and activism in the present.
Emphasizing contingency also helps scholars understand how they are framing their histories and what violence they are doing to actors in the past (and present) in reducing them down to fit a simple narrative. Hayden White's writing, especially Metahistory (1973), dwelt upon just how much historians emplot, streamline, or simplify the past to suit the needs of the present. 12 This is called teleology, narrating the past to conform to what we in the present know to be its future. While teleology cannot be escaped altogether, indulging in it to the exclusion of all complexity in the past can erase knowledge about the spectrum of choices and ideas people had 11 Pierre Bourdieu, about themselves and the world around them in a given historical context. A too-simple past destroys any basic understanding of an historical context as animated by multiple, shifting factors that generated all kinds of possible futures and with that the knowledge that circumstances today are also contingent. A too-simple past ignores and renders historically insignificant the activity of people who resisted dominant trends in the past and, in doing so, shaped the outcome of these trends. 13 If a narrative only attends to one side (and there are many sides) of the story, it is failing to render a realistic picture of how events transpire and the politics of that could be at cross-purposes to what the scholar is arguing. Part of the trick of claiming authority over the present by claiming authority over the past is to erase histories of resistance and with them the possibility of contingency; thus, if a scholar does not acknowledge the complexity of the past, they play into the politics of those who claim the universal benefit, application, or acceptance of a given development. Often, historians put a premium on foregrounding knowledge about non-dominant forms in the past because this problematizes ideas about the hegemony of dominant forms in the present. Scholars who adopt familiar framing devices into their work without thinking about contingency run the risk of reproducing teleologies that were designed to serve certain politics. For example, assuming a plot about the "rise of the nation" or the "establishment of a settler colony," requires the reader to understand the settler colony or the nation as a foregone conclusion in a context where that, for the actors involved, was only one of many possible futures. Casting "Others" as historically insignificant can also serve to write them out of the present and the future, normalizing a dominant development and those who furthered it while invalidating or villainizing difference from and resistance to it. While historical scholars have contended with White's ideas for decades, other disciplines, even his home discipline of literary criticism, tend not to study his critiques, perhaps assuming them to be only consequential for historians. This is unfortunate; while scholars such as Edward Said had huge interdisciplinary effects by revealing specific emplotments (in Said's case, uncovering the bias known as orientalism), I am not sure that many scholars consciously wrestle with, and thus take seriously, historical emplotment, unless they already subscribe to a given plot, such as that of Marxism or religious manifest destiny. 14
13
For The most extreme case of scholars rendering the past too simple is when some look to emphasize the importance and urgency of their work by arguing that an issue today is so complex that it is of an entirely different kind than anything seen before. Yet they still include an historical narrative in their work. This may come in the form of the seemingly obligatory "historical background" section in an introduction. Why spend any time at all with the "historical background" section, if it is irrelevant? What argumentative leverage is the author gaining for themselves in including a past that they have already framed as empty of meaningful tension? Some "Enlightenment" intellectuals, as they understood themselves, worked in this framework in eighteenth-century Europe when they wrote the history of Europe as progressing from the pre-modern "Dark Ages" (full of simpletons and superstition) to the modern "Enlightenment" era (animated by reason and complexity). The takeaway message of the plot is not hard to discern: the "beforetimes" people are interesting but irrelevant today, don't be like them. Though purporting to reveal the history of the Middle Ages, their framework obscured knowledge of how it was alive with contingency and potential. This was done in the fervor to characterize the modern period as progressive. 15 Many of these same Enlightenment scholars also wrote about Africa as the "Dark Continent," full of simpletons and superstition, the "Orient" as mysterious and stagnant, and Indigenous peoples around the world as primitive and childlike. Their writings participated in the advent of racism: "Others" were contrasted with Christian Europeans who were assumed to be progressive, matured, modern, and scientific. Again, the takeaway message is not hard to discern: "Others" are interesting but not relevant or important, don't be like them. As Edward Said et alia have shown, the scholarship that was written within this framework worked to hide the complex, contingent realities that animated these "Other" contexts and enabled Western imperialism. 16 It has also become clear that similar, interrelated, and even more long-standing reductive thinking has been alive in the long history of normativities about sex, gender, sexuality, and patriarchy. 17 Making the past too simple, or dealing with it as irrelevant, can play into dehumanizing political projects and uncritical engagements with troubling pasts.
An anecdote related to this is from a few years ago when I attended an interdisciplinary seminar about pedagogy. One sociologist explained how her course on social policy in Canada was built upon an historical perspective because the first class was about the Poor Laws in England, how they developed because of the Irish Famine, and how this legal framework became the bedrock of Canadian social law. Throughout the course she would refer back to how Canadian law was not originally designed to administer Canadian reality and how Canadians now need to overhaul it in light of the complexities of today. The first "history" class was about British racism and prejudice toward Irish migrants and her takeaway message was: this law is from "beforetimes" when people were racist, let's not be like them.
To be clear, I support the politics of anti-racism and I would like to see Canadian social law reworked for 2019. But the argumentative strategy above is not about historicization. This past is too simple. The English Poor Laws, first introduced in the sixteenth century but conceived of earlier than that, did not develop because of the Irish Famine, which began in 1845. The Laws were amended several times in the nineteenth century, one time in the midst of the Famine in 1847 and it was a major amendment to be sure, taking place while not only the United Kingdom but all of Europe was in the throes of famine and much activism calling for political revolution. But the Laws were also dramatically amended in the 1830s and 1860s, two decades of massive liberal reforms, the latter also featuring Canadian Confederation. The Poor Laws were bigger than 1847, although 1847 was an important shift in how people thought about social policy. By making the historical context of the Poor Laws so simple, my colleague had obliterated knowledge of just how complex those laws were designed to be, how many facets of socio-cultural life they attempted to define and proscribe, from mothering and childhood, to ideas about religion, liberalism, socialism, slavery, work, industrialization, leisure, governmentality, class, race, gender, sexuality, Englishness, Otherness, and civilization. She overlooked the reasons why people would have pressed to have the laws implemented in Canada, the reasons why others would have resisted them, and the ways in which they would have found to make their cases. She also discounted the reasons why some people would have fought to keep those ill-fitting laws as cornerstones of Canada's link with England and all that entailed. What she did was needlessly impair her students' ability to gain a complex understanding of the myriad ways the Poor Laws impacted the making of Canada, and what, exactly, the work of decolonizing from those laws still entails. If the goal is to "not be racist like those in past," people today have to be aware of all the complexities of that racism.
Nostalgic frameworks are another kind of "too simple" plot. They paint the past as a promised land from which people in the present have been cast out. These frameworks drain the historical context of any tension, forget about contingency, and see the past as a kinder, simpler time. The political uses of nostalgia and how scholars can study it as a political factor are topics with a robust and growing literature in historical studies. 18 The question to ask that usually disrupts facile nostalgia is "for whom?" For whom was the antebellum American South a place of opportunity and comfort? What are the circumstances of today that make some people long for a particular context in the past? How do the powers-that-be stage nostalgic frameworks and to what end? 19 There are significant drawbacks to framing one's historical perspective within a simple past, complex present plot; the choice to do so should be one that scholars are prepared to defend.
There are real drawbacks to emphasizing historical contingency and historicism that must be understood, as well. Overwhelmingly, academic history privileges an elite, modern, masculinized Western conception of time -that is time as proceeding in a regular, linear fashion with each temporal increment as uniquely animated by its historical context. There might be similarities between the contexts of two different time periods, but it is understood that they are not the same, particularly because one happened before the other, thus shaping the latter, even if indirectly. This is not the only way to think about time; there are other conceptions of it as cyclical or receding (from the future into the past), to name two examples. Historical contingency is usually not as important in these other paradigms nor is the need to grapple with transformation over time which, for some, is a project that works mainly to emphasize the distance between the past and the present. This distance, some argue, can needlessly create an understanding of community to be in terms of progress or decline; it can also alienate people from direct relationships with members of their group who are in a different dimension by temporizing them as "ancestors." Some communities hold many different, overlapping conceptions of time at once and this multiplicity is often not appreciated in the same way in Western academic paradigms. Therefore, rendering another person's past and imposing one's own understanding of time onto their past are highly political acts and it is no accident that Western academic historical practice developed out of and within European imperialism. Many Western thinkers went abroad and, in a lot of cases, destroyed the records of other peoples' pasts; repossessed those records to render other peoples' pasts; and/or argued that specific peoples who had different conceptions of time did not have historical consciousness, were inferior, and therefore required CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 colonization and civilizing, including the imposition of so-called "Western time" and so-called secular historical methodology. 20 The coalition between historical output and expansionist projects is not only a European invention; my intention with the above point about different conceptions of time is to underline how all scholars enter a battlefield when they write the "historical background" section of their study, even if all they think they are doing is putting events in chronological order. Depending on the priorities and frameworks of one's study, it might make more sense to problematize Western conceptions of time and "historical background," or strive to render an alternative past in multiple, fragmented ways, or something else. It might also make sense to work within Western academic historical methodologies. In order to argue for the historical significance of a certain group or development, the grounds of the debate are overwhelmingly weighted toward "Western" conceptions of time and space. Many current legal battles regarding land claims, mineral rights, personhood, and understandings of treaty negotiations, revolve around legal and historical narratives based on these conceptions -for many, it becomes politically necessary to work within a certain paradigm of time in order to achieve their goals. 21 Institutions within and outside the academy are coming to problematize Western-centric concepts of time but this process is slow and uneven. Thus, instead of automatically accepting Western secular time and historical methodology, know that this is another set of decisions one must make and be ready to defend. 22 Including an "historical background" section does not mean that someone has necessarily historicized their topic. alive in one's work, I would advocate three things. This first is to look for complexity in the past. Almost by default scholars look to make the story simpler so they can move on to the next section. Resist that urge and dig into the complexity of the story, especially when it helps to reveal the complexity of the issue today. If contradictions in the sources are impossible to reconcile, discuss. If there are few sources, discuss why. If there were a lot of factors at play and there is a huge historiography about the topic, discuss that. Detail the choices made to render a narrative of what happened in ways that gesture to a complex past but allow a focus on certain aspects of it. Go toward the complexity rather than away from it and continue to make connections between the complex past and the complex present throughout the work, not just in the "historical background" section. The second suggestion is to work to develop an understanding of historical context and how it changes over time. This is a limitless goal because there is always more context to imbibe but start with an overview of the history of the place and time under consideration. This means reading more of the book than just the section that is focused on the topic at hand but also reading into what happened in the historical context in general. For a topic on South Africa, for example, read a narrative of the whole sweep of southern African history, not just a narrow time period under study. What comes after and before one's topic makes a difference in how the topic has been characterized in the plot. Being cognizant of this will also work against the tendency to draw a facile straight line from twelfth-century France to France today, for example, because one will get a sense of the importance of the intervening centuries.
Finally, think about how the context was alive for the actors who lived it. This is an exercise in empathy but one with a focus on understanding how actors were constrained and enabled by their historical contexts. Think across different subject positions, think of the choices someone of one background and embodied reality would make versus someone of another. Are ways of thinking today meaningful in or appropriate for this historical context? This will lead to a more complex understanding of the historical context and how it created phenomena. It will compel an awareness of the framing devices scholars use to produce output about the past. The issue in the present will become glaringly contingent -it is through commonalities in contingency that the present is most directly connected to the past.
III. THE ARCHIVE IS NOT INNOCENT SO DO NOT ENGAGE WITH IT INNOCENTLY
A while ago I was part of an interdisciplinary seminar within an institute for research in the humanities. One participant, an artist, was about to embark on a project with a museum of local history. To bridge the distance CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 between the present and the past, he proposed to take archival materials from moments in the region's past and use them to artistically project audio, visual, or cinematic forms onto the walls of the main room as patrons moved through the space. He also wanted to emphasize how many different events have happened in the same place, so the projections would change based on how many people were in the main room -few people would mean that they would experience material from a less populated time in the past, more people would see a more populated time.
The study of how museums depict the past generally falls under the subfield of public history, which looks at how different publics engage with historical information and create their own historical consciousness in museums, art, fiction, film, video games, government-sponsored " Heritage Minutes," and so on. 23 I want to signal that public history exists but sidestep it here to get to a discussion about the archive and historians' relationship to it. Scholars producing history are actively engaged in the content and issue of the archive. It is the material upon which they base their analysis. Archive does not necessarily mean an old building full of government documents and birth certificates, although scholars certainly make use of those, but rather an imagined collection of all the records (also known as primary sources) that were created in the past and thus offer insight into historical contexts. In the past seventy years, or so, scholars have made great strides in broadening the field's understanding about what is a primary source, and what records are part of the archive. It used to be that mostly written sources, housed in official archives, were seen to be of historical significance and this narrowness of thinking about the archive generated fairly narrow historical narratives about political leaders, church activity, government policies, and famous dead people. What was housed in the archive was dependent upon who could write, who had access to writing materials, whose records would be kept, and whether or not those records contained information that others (archivists, bureaucrats, or people cleaning out their attics) thought were of historical value. Thus, traditional archives came to house print culture and the papers of the privileged, which means that the voices of literate, upper-class, white males who held prominent positions in government, religious institutions, military, and society are usually well-represented in these collections, to the exclusion of the voices of most others. Even then, scholars do not have a complete picture of these privileged individuals because choices were made in what was kept. Just as a given historical context was alive with choices about the future, so too did choices temper what is available for people to engage with from a given historical context. 24 To try to mitigate the kinds of biases alive in both the sources themselves and the development of the archive, scholars, including archivists, have worked to expand the definition of an archival source to include visual, audio, material, and memory-based sources, popular publications, and the general output of all kinds of different people, as well as the material space of the archive to be much more than "dust, disorder, and darkness," but rather, "community and design hubs." 25 While I am using the concept of "the archive" in a singular form here, I do not deny the diversity alive in archival sources, experiences, and spaces that now exist; especially when considering the archive as a material institution, it is better to think of "archives." Scores of archivists are working to make these spaces democratic and conducive to critical engagement and archives need not be institutions as such: they can also be individuals, communities, even cemeteries. 26 Still, a complete understanding of the past remains unattainable. One of the questions history teachers try to get students in the habit of asking of any source is, "Why was it created?" What work were these sources designed to do for the person who created them, for the powers that be, and so on? In studying the creation of concepts like "the archive" and archives as physical spaces many argue that knowledge is power, that the agenda behind censuses, birth certificates, and other population studies, the breadand-butter of archival information, is about social control. 27 So is the project to gather up or destroy other people's records of their own pasts. Even limiting access to archives is about social control or resistance to that control, some argue. 28 Thus, the archive as a concept and archives as material spaces are not objective or benign. They are not valueless cross-sections of the past but curated experiences and samples of sources that were created for an array of reasons. 29 While scholars develop more and better techniques for danielle c. kinsey CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 engaging with all different types of sources, considering their context in the archive, there are limits to what can be learned about the past. Scholars have very, very little information about how enslaved people experienced their incarceration across the ocean during the Atlantic Slave Trade, from their point of view. 30 There is comparatively very little in the archive that was produced by women, even women of privilege such as the Rani of Sirmur in nineteenth-century India, as theorist Gayatri Spivak revealed; she could not even find the woman's first name in the archive. 31 In other words, there are real, historically significant silences in the archive that need to be taken into account. 32 Some view the archive as a technology of rule, an intervenor in power hierarchies, a place where some voices are deliberately silenced and derogated vis-à-vis other voices.
Scholars must also approach any information they do find with suspicion. Sometimes they take for granted that the statistics printed by official outlets were accurate. Were they? What did government bureaucrats base their numbers on? People who work with the Soviet archive, for example, know well that the numbers reported to Moscow regarding local production were inaccurate; they are not the only ones who must be wary of numerical fiction in the sources. 33 This is not to say that quantitative analysis is impossible, just that engaging with the archive is never straightforward and is, again, about understanding historical context, approaching sources critically, and making choices. With the rise of the digital humanities some "Big Data" projects analyze numbers of archival documents that individual scholars could never process, producing new knowledge about information flows and word usage. Always the fear is that Big Data techniques will ignore historical context, the meaning of the sources, the "archival grain," the pregnant silences in the data, and so on. Researchers are working to mitigate these fears, of course, but the point is that they must keep historicization and the constructedness of the archive, as well as its sources, alive in their analysis. 34 Bringing this back to the artist's idea to project archival documents onto museum walls, I met his proposal with several questions. What kinds of archival sources would he feature and, in doing so, would he be giving museum-goers an idea that the only locally historically significant information came from documents like handwritten letters from homesteaders and clippings from the local gazette? Would he be able to communicate the partiality of the archive to the museum-goer? How would the sources be contextualized? When he planned to show sources from unpopulated time periods, where would he get the knowledge about population statistics? Would they reflect depopulated periods or just periods when there was a sparse European settler population? What would silences mean in his exhibition and if they meant nothing, was the artist working to normalize biases alive in the archive? This last point I cared about most: if historians do not historicize the archive itself, understand it and its sources to be products of contingency, then we unthinkingly reproduce its biases and inequalities -this goes for any project; artistic, textual, digital, or quantitative. Many in the seminar echoed my misgivings and the artist was horrified to learn that the archive was not innocent. He ended up pursuing a different project but this was no victory because an opportunity to educate people about how the archive is its own kind of battleground was lost.
My advice: consider the primary sources one is using, where they came from and why. Consider the primary sources others have used, how, and why. The archive is its own contested terrain, full of choices and contingency rather than the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Whether doing primary research or not, one is engaging with the archive because, at the least, one's study of the present will soon become a primary source for those who study the past. Consider the biases that are being reenacted by the current project and be ready to defend its relationship to the archive.
CONCLUSION
Time is the dimension of reality that historical scholars track par excellence. Historians tend to put a premium on organizing things into chronological order because the sequence of events matter, the earlier development putting pressure on the next and the next and the next. In putting a premium on time and thinking about time as historical context, we also put a premium on tracking transformation (some say change) over time and explaining this transformation. This also entails explaining continuity because, again, continuity does not just happen, it occurs because elements in the historical context make it rational for people to try to work against change. The process of historicization is to map this transformation so that people in the present can know (or try to know) all of the different power plays and contingencies that were built into the topic, over time, and how certain elements became significant and insignificant. If people are interested in effecting change in the world around them today, historical thinking helps 20 danielle c. kinsey CJH/ACH 54.1-2 © 2019 to identify the attitudes, structures, and cultural formations that work to keep things as they are. Whatever one's politics, to think historically is to think in terms of contingent historical context and how it transforms over time. Keeping this in mind, I think, will help people to answer, in specific ways, how history matters for their work and how they choose to approach the present. The two are not disconnected at all. danielle c. kinsey is an assistant professor in the department of history at Carleton University. She is currently working on a book about Britain, diamonds, and the diamond trade in the nineteenth century. She also serves as chair of the Teaching and Learning Committee on the Council of the Canadian Historical Association.
